What the projects in San Juan are going to buy

It produces gold without a plant of its own: it toll-processes at Casposo, 450,000 t guaranteed over three years, ore hauled 165 km, on barely ~USD 8.9 M of initial capital. Nobody planned that arrangement: idle capacity and an ore owner turned up, and the price brought them together. For a supplier that means the heavy haulage market between Hualilán and Casposo exists today, without waiting for any construction.

The business rests on an already installed asset that was underused —Austral Gold's Casposo plant— not on a new plant. The demand it creates is operating demand from day one: haulage, plant services and concentrate logistics.

It has filed El Pachón (USD 9,500 M) and Agua Rica (USD 4,000 M) and neither is approved: it is the largest pool of capital waiting in the portfolio. A major decides a commitment like that on the certainty of being able to repatriate the return, which is exactly what the regime promises and free access to foreign exchange delivers.

At Agua Rica what blocks it is neither the copper price nor financing: it is the environmental exploitation permit, which has not been filed, plus the court front and Andalgalá's social licence. There the barrier is regulatory, and until it is removed there is no buying date to read.

The resolution sets it a deadline of Dec 31, 2027 to certify the minimum investment, and that forces early construction: the declared plan jumps from USD 33.5 M in the first year to USD 382.3 M in the second. Buying is pulled forward by the obligation to certify, not by construction progress.

It is a junior financing itself with strategic partners —Stellantis as an automotive offtaker and Rio Tinto through Nuton on the cap table—: the project advances at the pace at which it raises capital, and that pace moves with the cost of capital as much as with the copper price.

It was admitted on Nov 27, 2025 with a deadline of Dec 31, 2028: exploration, feasibility and construction of Carbonatos Profundos have to fit into three years, so buying is compressed by the resolution and not by the geological pace of the deposit at depth.

The mine is not idle: it produces residual gold through secondary leaching while it builds. That opens a replacement and services market on the existing plant today, in parallel with the one for the new works and with another buyer inside the same company.

Veladero has been operating since 2005 and produced 505 koz of gold in 2024: it is the asset that holds up San Juan's mining floor and it buys replacement every month —reagents, spares, mine services, haulage— without depending on any expansion being approved.

Leaching Phases 8 and 9 are two construction windows with a gap in between: July 2024 to May 2027 the first, September 2027 to June 2028 the second. For the earthworks and geomembrane supplier that gap decides whether it keeps equipment in the area or dismantles it.

It is already the largest buyer in San Juan's supply chain —264 active supplier companies, 158 of them from the province— and it has still not taken the investment decision: what it pays for today is pre-FID early works and detailed engineering, not construction. That is the open window, and it is the one almost nobody is watching.

It is the largest mining project in Argentine history and the first copper PEELP: the mix is capital-intensive and permanent employment only arrives with operations, in 2030. What lands in Iglesia first is construction spending and the services that come with it.

Its output sets the physical volume of every later phase: how much rock moves per year is the number that fleet, fuel and maintenance demand hangs on.

It is demand from the advanced exploration phase, the earliest of all: it arrives years before the large civil works and is contracted by the owner itself, not by an EPC.

It sits on the side the operator counts when it states that more than 69% of its purchases and contracts go to San Juan suppliers: local content seen from the supplier, not from the statute.

It sits on the side the operator counts when it states that more than 69% of its purchases and contracts go to San Juan suppliers: local content seen from the supplier, not from the statute.

It sits on the side the operator counts when it states that more than 69% of its purchases and contracts go to San Juan suppliers: local content seen from the supplier, not from the statute.

It sits on the side the operator counts when it states that more than 69% of its purchases and contracts go to San Juan suppliers: local content seen from the supplier, not from the statute.

It sits on the side the operator counts when it states that more than 69% of its purchases and contracts go to San Juan suppliers: local content seen from the supplier, not from the statute.

It is engineering prior to the investment decision, and its result conditions the volume of the project's main works contract.

It sits on the side the operator counts when it states that more than 69% of its purchases and contracts go to San Juan suppliers: local content seen from the supplier, not from the statute.

It sits on the side the operator counts when it states that more than 69% of its purchases and contracts go to San Juan suppliers: local content seen from the supplier, not from the statute.

It sits on the technical control tier of the works, contracted separately from construction and starting with it. For a professional-services SME it is a different door from the builder's, and one with less capital required.

That the consultancy keeps its own team in San Juan is a signal that the high technical tier is being contracted inside the country: it is demand for local engineers and technicians that did not exist in the province before.

It sits on the side the operator counts when it states that more than 69% of its purchases and contracts go to San Juan suppliers: local content seen from the supplier, not from the statute.

It occupies the process technology tier, which is settled before construction and conditions what gets bought afterwards: whoever supplies the package leaves the assembly specifications fixed.

Its window is earthworks and geosynthetics, which opens at the start of construction and closes before commissioning. That is why it shows up at the same step in two different projects and two provinces: it does not sell a product, it sells a phase.

Who it competes against is defined by provincial law, not by the market: Salta and San Juan set the miner a purchasing floor for companies based in the province, and a local SME that partners up or registers competes for that quota with an advantage Milicic cannot match without moving its head office.

It is the case that shows what a tender reserved for companies of the province is for: the route Zlato used to get into Vicuña was a process open only to San Juan firms, and from there it reached the other two projects. Local content did not hand it a sale: it handed it the first track record.

It sits on the side the operator counts when it states that more than 69% of its purchases and contracts go to San Juan suppliers: local content seen from the supplier, not from the statute.

It sits on the side the operator counts when it states that more than 69% of its purchases and contracts go to San Juan suppliers: local content seen from the supplier, not from the statute.

It sits on the side the operator counts when it states that more than 69% of its purchases and contracts go to San Juan suppliers: local content seen from the supplier, not from the statute.

It is the earliest tier of all and ends when the investment decision is taken. Its output —the feasibility study— is the project's shopping list made public.

It sits on the side the operator counts when it states that more than 69% of its purchases and contracts go to San Juan suppliers: local content seen from the supplier, not from the statute.

The power line is work that stays: when construction ends it is still there and still needs maintenance, inspection and replacement. It is demand that does not switch off with the construction peak.

It sits on the side the operator counts when it states that more than 69% of its purchases and contracts go to San Juan suppliers: local content seen from the supplier, not from the statute.