What the projects in Neuquén are going to buy

It is a shareholder in both VMOS and Southern Energy: it put capital into both ways out —crude through the Atlantic and liquefied gas through the Gulf— because its output grows at the speed of evacuation and not of the well. Its plan is read by looking at the pipelines and the coast.

Putting together an LNG business with international partners requires the return to be collectable abroad: free access to foreign exchange is what turns the project into something a major is willing to sign. Without it, Vaca Muerta gas stays in the domestic market and the export plan does not exist.

It is the largest independent shale producer and a VMOS shareholder: it put capital into the way out and not only into the well, which is the right answer once the constraint moved to transport. Its output grows at the speed at which evacuation grows.

As an independent with no refining business, it collects almost the pure export price: its drilling pace is among the quickest to react to a change in netback, upwards and downwards.

It scaled up by buying ExxonMobil's assets and plans more than 600 wells at Bajo del Choique: the real pace of that drilling is set by the wellhead netback, not by the announced figure, and demand for sand, water and equipment moves with it.

The development carries a compulsory 10% carry for Gas y Petróleo del Neuquén: there is a provincial partner inside the operation, and it is the route through which the province captures rent and pushes local contracting without going through the federal regime.

It is the country's second-largest gas producer, and unconventional gas is worth nothing without a way to take it out: that is why Los Toldos II Este includes a processing plant, compression and its own evacuation pipelines before drilling at scale.

Its development carries a compulsory 10% carry for Gas y Petróleo del Neuquén: the province captures rent through a route the federal regime does not stabilise, and it keeps a say over purchasing and local contracting inside the operation.

Its bet is on the export business through both routes, crude via VMOS and gas via Southern Energy: both are evacuation. As long as the capacity to take the product out is the constraint, that is where its spending concentrates, and not on adding wells.

As the country's second-largest oil producer, its drilling pace moves with the netback: every improvement in relative prices at the wellhead widens the margin and pulls activity forward, with demand for sand, water, equipment and logistics behind it.

It is the dataset's textbook case for the rule: it multiplied its capex tenfold at Rincón de Aranda once it secured the crude's way out. It was not the price that moved the investment, it was evacuation — first you settle where it comes out, then you drill.

Rincón de Aranda has three stages dated in the resolution: CPF, pipelines and 50 wells through 2028; 70 wells through 2031; 139 wells through 2041. The first buys civil works and plant; the following ones, drilling and repeat logistics.

Its market is the fracturing stage, and the number of stages is decided by the wellhead netback: when the margin improves, wells are pulled forward and with them sand, water, chemicals and transport; when it worsens, the first spending to be postponed is fracturing.

Even if the price holds up, if evacuation capacity is at its limit fracturing activity slows anyway: the operator does not drill what it cannot take out. That is why demand for well services is read by looking at the pipelines, not only at the barrel.

It is the world's largest oilfield services company and one of the two dominant players in fracturing in Vaca Muerta: its volume of work is the number of stages, and that number is set by the wellhead netback, not by the operator's investment announcement.

If evacuation fills up, the operator stops drilling even if the price holds up, and fracturing is the first thing to be postponed. Demand for well services is read by looking at the pipelines as much as at the barrel.

It lost the San Matías pipeline's pipe to Welspun, whose bid came in 28% below its own: it is the textbook case of openness breaking a steel quasi-monopoly. Whoever buys pipe today gets to choose, and the local supplier of services around the pipe no longer depends on a single buyer.

Its demand for tubulars follows the number of wells, and that number is set by the netback: every improvement in relative prices at the wellhead pulls drilling forward and OCTG consumption with it. Its dual role —pipe and fracturing— leaves it exposed to the same cycle from two sides.