What the projects in Neuquén are going to buy

It is a shareholder in both VMOS and Southern Energy: it put capital into both ways out —crude through the Atlantic and liquefied gas through the Gulf— because its output grows at the speed of evacuation and not of the well. Its plan is read by looking at the pipelines and the coast.

Putting together an LNG business with international partners requires the return to be collectable abroad: free access to foreign exchange is what turns the project into something a major is willing to sign. Without it, Vaca Muerta gas stays in the domestic market and the export plan does not exist.

It is the largest independent shale producer and a VMOS shareholder: it put capital into the way out and not only into the well, which is the right answer once the constraint moved to transport. Its output grows at the speed at which evacuation grows.

As an independent with no refining business, it collects almost the pure export price: its drilling pace is among the quickest to react to a change in netback, upwards and downwards.

It scaled up by buying ExxonMobil's assets and plans more than 600 wells at Bajo del Choique: the real pace of that drilling is set by the wellhead netback, not by the announced figure, and demand for sand, water and equipment moves with it.

The development carries a 10% carry for Gas y Petróleo del Neuquén, holder of the concession since 2015: there is a provincial partner inside the operation, and it is the route through which the province captures rent and pushes local contracting without going through the federal regime.

It is the country's second-largest unconventional gas producer, and that gas is worth nothing without a way to take it out: that is why Los Toldos II Este includes a processing plant, compression and its own evacuation pipelines before drilling at scale.

Its development carries a 10% carry for Gas y Petróleo del Neuquén, a partner in the joint venture since the 2019 concession: the province captures rent through a route the federal regime does not stabilise, and it keeps a say over purchasing and local contracting inside the operation.

Its bet is on the export business through both routes, crude via VMOS and gas via Southern Energy: both are evacuation. As long as the capacity to take the product out is the constraint, that is where its spending concentrates, and not on adding wells.

As the country's second-largest oil producer, its drilling pace moves with the netback: every improvement in relative prices at the wellhead widens the margin and pulls activity forward, with demand for sand, water, equipment and logistics behind it.

It is the dataset's textbook case for the rule: it multiplied its capex tenfold at Rincón de Aranda once it secured the crude's way out. It was not the price that moved the investment, it was evacuation — first you settle where it comes out, then you drill.

Rincón de Aranda has three stages dated in the resolution: CPF, pipelines and 50 wells through 2028; 70 wells through 2031; 139 wells through 2041. The first buys civil works and plant; the following ones, drilling and repeat logistics.