Despegue ← San Juan OPPORTUNITY
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San Juan · Casposo-Hualilán · the first ore toll-milling agreement we know of in the country
It lasted four months, left the price published and proved that the good client leavesthesis

Shared processing capacity: ore toll milling in San Juan

No defensible market figure
The toll-milling agreement between Hualilán and Casposo was terminated with effect from 1 October 2026, after the client announced in August that it is leaving third-party plant processing and declared in September that its projections «are superseded».
up to date · reviewed Oct 2, 2026
verif Sep 10, 2026 ↗window openour reading
At a glance
Who buys
The miner with a deposit and no plant
the 3 doors →
In which projects
Gualcamayo, Leaching Phases 8 and 9 expansion
what each one invests →
When
The campaign closed on 30 June 2026 and in August the only customer announced it is moving to its own plant: today this market bills nothing. It comes back into existence only if the exploration at Del Carmen and Jagüelito confirms ore with nowhere to mill it. thesis
what to watch and where it stands →
The main barrier
The mill does not have a capital problem: it has a customer problem. The best customer of a toll mill is the one that cannot yet build its own plant, and it leaves as soon as it can: you have to sustain a portfolio that turns over. thesis
the whole entry map →
Where you get in
The gap is one of asset and of portfolio: what San Juan lacks is grinding and flotation capacity that is compatible and available to third parties, and the hard part is not the capital but the client, who leaves as soon as it can pay for a plant of its own.
the 4 routes →

In May 2026 it started milling and in June out came 200 kilos of unrefined gold and silver bar. On 1 October 2026 the contract was terminated. Challenger Gold put its Hualilán orebody into production in another miner's mill —Casposo, owned by Austral Gold, idle since 2019 and refurbished for USD 7 million—, processed 39,342 tonnes in two months and on 13 August 2026 announced it is leaving that scheme. It was the first shared-processing agreement between miners that we know of in Argentina, it lasted four months, and it left two things worth more than the contract. The first is the price, published line by line: milling a tonne cost USD 75.00, plus the recovery premium, plus USD 8.06 for the right of use of the plant and USD 17.50 of haulage — USD 133.28 per tonne all in. The second is the proof that the scheme works: the agreement's study calculated that starting this way would cost USD 8.9 million; its own plant requires USD 267 million. The same orebody entered production through someone else's mill, with planned capital thirty times smaller, and left when it could pay for its plant. That is exactly the shape of this business: the good client does not stay. On the other side the province still has ore waiting, and the mill is still permitted, running and looking for clients.

The only agreement that ever existed lasted four months: it started milling on 1 May 2026, processed 39,342 tonnes and closed its campaign on 30 June.

See the clocks that are running, one by one
on 13 August the client announced it is leaving the scheme, and the contract was terminated with effect from 1 October 2026. It is a market that does not bill today, and it comes back into existence only if another miner turns up with a deposit and no plant. The durable part is not the contract: it is the price, which remains published and is what any entrant bids against.

verif primary sourceestim our own calculationthesis our readingHow to read all five →

Who really pays?

This market has two possible clients and they are not the same business — and today neither of the two is buying:

If you sellThird-party ore grinding with guaranteed capacity
→
The miner with a deposit and no plant verif Sep 11, 2026 ↗

It was the contract that existed: it processed from 1 May 2026 and closed its campaign on 30 June with 39,342 tonnes verif. What the miner was buying was committed capacity —450,000 tonnes over three years, some 150,000 a year— and what it paid is published verif. The client announced its exit in August 2026 verif and the contract was terminated with effect from 1 October 2026; what is still being negotiated in its place is a purchase of ore, not yet signed verif.

If you sellOre freight between the deposit and the plant
→
The same miner; haulage had its own price, separate from processing verif Jun 4, 2025 ↗

The ore travelled 165 km of sealed highway between Hualilán and the plant, and haulage was charged separately from processing: USD 17.50 per tonne, published in the agreement's study. With the end of the contract that haulage stopped running. That it was a new market, created by toll milling because ore processed at its own mine site does not travel, is our own reading thesis.

If you sellModular grinding and mobile crushing
→
The small deposits around it, which are not clients yet prob Oct 28, 2025 ↗

The small deposits of the Andean belt are not clients yet, and they are the reason this niche can exist again. The Del Carmen and Jagüelito areas, in Iglesia, were awarded in October 2025 to a joint venture led by Veladero's Chinese partner, with USD 56 million of exploration committed over three years and the possibility of moving to mining. Until that exploration confirms, there is nobody to sell to.

▸
The difference between the first two doors and the third is time, and today all three are on the same side: none of them bills. What the case left behind is the published price —which any entrant bids against— and a warning worth more than the contract: the business is not built on one large client, it is built on a portfolio of small clients that rotate.

Which projects move this demand

Reactivation and deepening of the Gualcamayo gold and silver mine (San Juan): the 'Deep Carbonates (DCP)' project extends the mine life toward the sulfide orebody at depth…

see the project →

Engineering, construction, operation and maintenance of new leach pads (phases 8 and 9) at Veladero Mine, to sustain gold production and exports…

see the project →

When the window opens

This market opens and closes on a single fact: whether there is a miner with a deposit and no plant. These four numbers say when the next one turns up.

What to watchWhat changes when it happensStatus
The ore purchase agreement between Hualilán and Casposo
It is what would replace toll milling, and it is a different market: buying ore is not charging to mill it. If it is signed, the mill stops being a service provider and becomes a buyer, exposed to the metal price.
the toll-milling contract was terminated with effect from 1 October 2026, and the two companies continue to discuss in good faith a possible agreement for Casposo to buy ore from Hualilán: as of 2 October 2026 there is no signed agreement.
See the evidence
On 9 September the mill's owner had stated that the new arrangement would be non-exclusive and would allow third-party ore to be blended with its own verif
verif Oct 2, 2026 ↗
The schedule for Hualilán's own plant
It closes the window for good for the only customer this market had.
construction in the second half of 2027, production in early 2029, pre-production capital of some USD 267 million including contingency, and an application to the large-investment regime planned for the end of September 2026 with confirmation expected in the first half of 2027 verif Sep 10, 2026 ↗
The exploration of Del Carmen and Jagüelito
It is the only thing that can bring the next customer: confirmed ore with no plant to mill it in.
awarded in October 2025 with USD 56 million committed over three years of exploration and the possibility of moving to mining prob Oct 28, 2025 ↗
The gold price
It decides whether a small deposit justifies milling. The study behind the agreement itself published two scenarios: USD 88.0 M of operating result with gold at USD 2,500 an ounce and USD 142.8 M with gold at USD 3,300.
daily series; the two published scenarios are from June 2025 verif Jun 4, 2025 ↗
What signals the game has changed
The good client leaves when it grows (permanent — the trade's structural killer)

Toll milling is for starting, not for staying, and this time there is a measurement: the only client that ever existed lasted four months.

See the evidence
Challenger started milling on 1 May 2026, closed its campaign on 30 June, announced the transition on 13 August and on 10 September withdrew the validity of its own toll-milling study. Its own plant asks for USD 267 million with contingency and produces from the beginning of 2029. It is the trade's structural risk and it has no cheap mitigant: it is offset with client rotation, not with loyalty.
One seller, one buyer, and the buyer left

It is the niche's real risk and it has already materialised. It replaces the one this entry used to list —«there is no public tariff»— which turned out to be false. With a single provider and a single client, one of them leaving switches off the whole market: there is no portfolio to absorb the fall.

See the evidence
And what is being negotiated in its place moves the risk to the other side: buying the ore instead of charging to mill it turns the mill's owner into a taker of the metal price.
Installed capacity is not compatible capacity

Veladero and Gualcamayo have processing infrastructure at scale, but they leach: in valleys and in heaps. The toll milling this market calls for is grinding and flotation of high-grade veins. Counting the province's capacity without separating circuits gives a number that means nothing.

It is sunk capital against rotating demand

A fixed plant amortizes over years and its client base changes. That is why the viable shape is probably not another plant, but modular grinding and mobile crushing, which move to the ore.

See the remaining risk
Small ore depends on someone exploring it first

The Del Carmen and Jagüelito areas were awarded in October 2025 with USD 56 million of exploration committed over three years and the possibility of moving to mining prob Diario de Cuyo.

See the evidence
the ounce resources circulating for each have no open source unconf. ⚠️ At the time of the official award announcement the contract had not yet been signed. Until that exploration confirms, there is no next client: and with no client this market does not exist.

The opportunity in depth

How to get inthe gap and the routes that open it
1

Installed capacity is not compatible capacity. Veladero and Gualcamayo process at scale, but they leach: in valleys and in heaps. The toll milling this market calls for is grinding and flotation of high-grade veins. Counting the province's capacity without separating circuits gives a number that means nothing.

2

The viable shape is probably not another fixed plant. A plant is sunk long-term capital against rotating demand —the good client leaves when it grows—. Modular grinding and mobile crushing move to the ore instead of waiting for the ore to come, and there is no installed local supply today.

3

An idle asset is not scrap. That is the lesson of the case: Casposo had been out of service since 2019, was rehabilitated with USD 7 million and became the only provider we know of in the country. It earned value from its mill, not from its reserves.

4

And the barrier that does not exist: there is something to bid against. Entering this business is not done blind. The tariff is published and remains published even though the contract has ended: USD 133.28 per tonne all in, broken out into treatment, recovery premium, right of use of the plant, haulage and general expenses. It is the only published toll-milling price we found in the country.

What you needcapital, certification, tax regime and who pays
Plants that provided toll milling in San Juan
one only, and today it mills its own ore
Clients that used it
one only, and it lasted four months: it started in May 2026, suspended shipments in June and in August announced it is going to a plant of its own
What was processed, against what had been committed
39,342 tonnes in two months, against 450,000 over three years
What milling a tonne cost, all in
USD 133.28 — the only published toll-milling price we found in the country
What it costs to enter through someone else's mill, against your own plant
USD 8.9 million according to the 2025 study, now superseded, against USD 267 million
Declared ore with no plant in the province
no open source: the figures circulating for Jagüelito and Del Carmen could not be confirmed
▸ You tell us where to see what your company does and we tell you whether we see a sign that it fits this opportunity, with the evidence behind it. See if my company fits this opportunity →
When you get paid, and what blocks it
It was paid, it is known how much, and it is over. The agreement between Hualilán and Casposo guaranteed 150,000 tonnes a year and 450,000 over three years; 39,342 tonnes were processed in two months and the campaign closed on 30 June 2026. The price was published line by line and it is the only thing that outlives the contract: USD 133.28 per tonne all in, of which USD 75.00 is treatment, the recovery premium runs from USD 15.00 to USD 22.50 depending on how much gold is recovered —and the top step was paid, because recovery came in above 85 %—, USD 8.06 is the right of use of the plant, USD 17.50 the haulage over 165 kilometres and USD 13.97 the general expenses. ⚠️ And there is a million still to collect: in its September accounts, the client recorded that it still owed USD 1 million for that right of use, falling due on 10 January 2027 with 6 % annual interest verif, on an asset it had just written off in full. On terminating the contract, with effect from 1 October 2026, that same balance was rescheduled: Challenger will pay Casposo USD 1.0 million, which the announcement presents as the deferred balance of the contract's initial fee, on 2 April 2029 or at the start of Hualilán's commercial production, whichever comes first; the accrued interest was waived, and the 6 % only runs if it does not pay on time verif. It is not a new debt: it is the previous one with a different due date and no interest.
Who you compete againstwho is already there and what share they take
Who is
already in
Market
split
Casposo (Austral Gold, Elsztain group) — the only one that provided the service100 % of the market for as long as the market existed

It refurbished a plant idle since 2019 for USD 7 M and turned it into a toll-milling business, the first we know of in the country, with a single client.

See the evidence
That client announced its exit in August 2026 verif, and the contract was terminated with effect from 1 October 2026 verif and the company keeps processing its own ore, stating that it expects no material financial impact. ⭐ And it declared what matters most to anyone looking at this niche: that it continues to assess other processing opportunities and purchases of third-party ore in the San Juan region, where Casposo is one of the few plants permitted and in operation verif. ⚠️ A governance fact worth keeping in view: according to the client's own accounts, Austral Gold was *«an entity related to Mr Elsztain, non-executive chairman of the group»* — who left the chairmanship on 6 August 2026, seven days before the transition was announced.
The client's own planttakes the market when the deposit grows

It is this business's structural competitor: toll milling is for starting, not for staying. In May 2026 Challenger published the pre-feasibility study for its own plant: some USD 267 million of pre-production capital with contingency, for a mine life of 14.25 years verif.

See the evidence
the specialist press reported that same study as USD 232 million of startup capital prob. When the deposit justifies the investment, the client leaves. A toll-milling business is built on client rotation, not on loyalty.
The plants of the large gold operationsidle capacity that is not offered

Veladero and Gualcamayo have processing infrastructure at scale, but their circuit is valley and heap leaching, not grinding and flotation of high-grade veins: it is not the same service and it does not work for the same ore. Capacity exists in the province; compatible capacity is a different thing.

Modular plants and mobile crushingno local supply yet

It is the shape the market would take if someone built it: modular grinding and flotation, mobile crushing, and toll-milling contracts for the small deposits around it. There is no installed supply today — the provincial analysis itself declares it a gap.

The jobs it createsIt is the niche that carries furthest the idea that an idle asset is not scrap: Casposo had been out of service since 2019, was refurbished with USD 7 million and produced gold again.

the detail on jobs and trades
That is employment, suppliers and royalties that did not exist, in Calingasta. And it leaves a second lesson, more uncomfortable and more useful: a small deposit can enter production with thirty times less capital if somebody lends it the mill, and that cuts years off the road between a discovery and the province's first invoice. What the case also showed is the limit: whoever uses someone else's mill leaves as soon as it can build its own.

Non-addressable

The only plant that provided the service in the province is still a single one —Casposo— and today it mills its own ore. For as long as there was a service, it took 100 % of a market that had a single client. estim

Addressable share

What is addressable is not the contract that ended: it is the next one. The ore that today has nowhere to go —Del Carmen and Jagüelito, with USD 56 million of exploration committed prob and ounce resources with no open source— plus the small deposits of the Andean belt. With no signed contract it has no size. thesis

Entry range for a supplier

The realistic way in is not buying a plant: it is mobile crushing and modular milling, which move to the ore and are written down against a rotating portfolio instead of against a single client. With no contract in force, no figure can be put on it. thesis

Why we do not put a number on it The only contract that existed —and that was the whole market— has ended, and the issuer withdrew the validity of the study that quantified it. There is no contract in force against which to measure an entry share, and the business that would replace it —buying ore instead of charging to mill it— is not signed and is in any case a different business, with a different risk. Putting a figure on it today would mean annualising a contract that is no longer running.

▸ The binding limit is that this market does not bill today: the only contract that ever existed closed its campaign on 30 June 2026, the client announced the transition in August and on 10 September withdrew the validity of the study that published the tariff and the volume; the contract was terminated with effect from 1 October 2026. What is being negotiated in its place —buying the ore instead of charging to mill it— is not signed. And the second limit: the tariff that is kept is that of a contract that no longer runs, published by the buyer itself in its study, not a market price surveyed by a third party.
How we
calculate it

The number is our own estimate. The calculation, step by step, is below.

The full calculation, step by step
⛔ THIS CALCULATION HAS NO CONTRACT BEHIND IT TODAY. The agreement it came from closed its campaign on 30 June 2026, the client announced the transition on 13 August and on 10 September 2026 it declared superseded the study that published the volume and the term. The contract was terminated with effect from 1 October 2026 verif . The only thing that survives is the unit tariff, and that is why the calculation is kept written out in full:Annualization window: the contract's own, 33 months from May 2026 (closing around February 2029). ⚠️ It is the only window in the province that comes from a private contract rather than from an act of the State. The TAM does not spread a capex over years: it multiplies a published tariff by the volume of a campaign with a start and an end date. Consequence, and it is the harshest of all: when the campaign ends, this market switches off entirely unless the next client appears — today there is one seller and one buyer. Its TAM/year does not compare with that of a niche of sustained demand.Published tariff × contracted volume. Both ends of the figure are data from the same document: Challenger Gold's ASX Release of the toll-milling PFS (4-Jun-2025), opened and read with our own eyes.⭐ And it is a price that barely exists in the region: the toll-milling service DOES have a public tariff in Argentina. It is not in the first-pour release nor in the study for the company's own plant —neither of the two is the agreement's document—: it is in the third one, which is, and it publishes the price broken down per tonne. An «it does not exist» only holds if the document where the figure would have to be was opened.Step 0 — THE TARIFF, in US$ per wet tonne processed verif Table 1 of the PFS:· Casposo Treatment Cost: US$ 75.00/t — the core of the milling price.· Processing Margin: US$ 15.00 / 18.75 / 22.50 per tonne — Austral Gold charges a premium based on the gold recovery it achieves (70-80 % / 80-85 % / above 85 %). The expected case is 84 %, so the expected premium is US$ 18.75 and the total paid for milling comes to US$ 93.75/t.· Toll Access Fee: US$ 8.06/t — the right of use, on top of treatment.· Ore Transport: US$ 17.50/t — haulage, published as a fixed price and not as a rate per tonne-kilometre.· The document itself closes the sum: *«Total Processing + Transport Unit Cost (at 84 % Au recovery) US$ 133.28/wmt (processed)»*. The gap between that 133.28 and the 119.31 we use is the US$ 13.97/t of transport and process general expenses, which are the client's own and are paid to no provider: that is why they sit outside the TAM.Step 1 — THE VOLUME, and why it is a band. The agreement guaranteed 150,000 t/year for three years (450,000 in total) verif . But the PFS schedules those same 450,000 t over a 33-month campaign, treating ~25 kt/month in batches of three months on and three off, which gives an effective rate of ~164 kt/year. Both figures come from the same issuer and measure different things —the contractual floor and the production plan—, so the band runs from one to the other instead of picking the convenient one.(A) THE TOLL-MILLING SERVICE — the big block. 150-164 kt/year × (75.00 + 15.00 to 22.50 + 8.06) = USD 14.7-17.3 M/year. It is what the miner pays the mill owner to process someone else's ore, and it is the market proper.(B) ORE HAULAGE. 150-164 kt/year × US$ 17.50/t = USD 2.6-2.9 M/year, over the 165 km of sealed highway between Hualilán and Casposo verif our own routing over the open road network gives 160 km for the same pair, which is independent convergence. That it is a market that did not exist before is our own reading: ore processed at its own mine site does not travel thesis.TOTAL: USD 17.3-20.2 M/year, midpoint ~USD 18.7 M/year.THE FIGURE THAT CHANGES THE DECISION IS A DIFFERENT ONE. The June 2025 study calculated that Challenger could start producing with USD 8.9 M of upfront capital —*«total upfront spend is just US$8.9M (A$13.8M) which is US$4.2M upfront capex and US$4.7M working capital»*, verbatim from the study verif —. It is a projection of that study, not what was actually spent, and the issuer itself declared it superseded on 10 September 2026. Against that projection, the company's own plant requires some USD 267 M of pre-production capital with contingency, according to the May 2026 study verif : the same orebody could enter production with thirty times less capital, and the 2025 study calculated that this investment would be paid back in three months from the start of mining. That is what toll milling sells.⚠️ WHAT THIS FIGURE IS NOT. It is not a market tariff: it is the price of a single contract, between one buyer and one seller, declared by the buyer in its own study. ⛔ AND IT EXPIRED SOONER THAN EXPECTED: on 10 September 2026 the issuer itself declared that study superseded, and with it the volume and the term this figure came from. That is why there is no market size to publish; what still stands from this whole calculation is the unit price, which does not depend on the contract running. The ceiling of this business is measured not in dollars but in ore without a mill: the Del Carmen and Jagüelito areas, awarded for exploration in October 2025 (the ounce resources circulating for each have no open source and contradict each other) unconf, plus the Hualilán satellites, Jagüelito and the Calingasta veins.AND THE EBITDA RECONCILES, even if from a distance it seems not to. There is no contradiction: there are two gold-price assumptions. The PFS projects US$ 88.0 M of EBITDA at US$ 2,500/oz and US$ 142.8 M at US$ 3,300/oz, and the A$ 221 M in the release headline are those same US$ 142.8 M converted at the 0.645 the document itself declares. The «USD 195 M» that circulate are not in the document.What does NOT go into the figure (no double counting):(1) the gold and silver output, which belongs to the miner and not to the service provider.(2) Drilling and blasting at Hualilán, already counted by the province's blasting and explosives page.(3) Personnel transport, which has its own page.(4) The US$ 13.97/t of transport and process general expenses, which are the client's internal cost.(5) The US$ 8.12/t mining cost, which is extraction and not processing.

Concentration It was the most concentrated market in the province, and in the strangest way: there was one seller and one buyer. Casposo was the only plant providing toll milling in the province and Challenger its only client. Today there is no service: the contract was terminated with effect from 1 October 2026 and the mill keeps processing its own ore. What is still true, and the mill's owner says so, is that Casposo is one of the few plants permitted and in operation in the San Juan region — so the next small parcel of ore that turns up will again have a single counterparty.

The rule that moves it

Here the law does not create the market, but it decides who invoices it from within the province:

See the underlying reading

The underlying policy that opens up this demand. It is the same inference declared by the rules and the program pillars pushing in this direction.

the RIGI promise is kept
enables
San Juan: 80/60 local mining procurement
See the rule →
The Local Mining Development Law does not regulate toll milling, but it does define who may count as a local supplier against the targets of 60% purchasing and 80% employment.
See the full legal grounds
For a plant operator with idle capacity that works in its favour: the plant is an authorised operating establishment in the province, which is precisely the hardest requirement for a service provider coming from outside. A mill based in San Juan meets section 12 almost by definition.

Where the number comes from

⛔ No result in force: on 10 September 2026 the issuer itself declared superseded the study the volume and the term came from, so there are no annual tonnes to multiply against. What still stands is the unit price: USD 133.28 per tonne all in, at a recovery of 84 %.

See the calculation, the variables and how it was validated

The arithmetic this page used to publish is built from two things and both were in the same document: what the tonne costs and how many tonnes a year. The document is still public, but its issuer declared it superseded on 10 September 2026, so the result is withdrawn and what is kept are the unit prices, which are the only part that does not depend on the contract still running.

what milling and hauling a tonne cost, broken out and published: USD 75.00 of treatment, plus the recovery premium —USD 15.00 up to 80 % of gold recovered, USD 18.75 between 80 and 85 %, USD 22.50 above 85 %—, plus USD 8.06 for the right of use of the plant, USD 17.50 of haulage over 165 kilometres and USD 13.97 of general expenses=⛔ No current result: there are no annual tonnes to multiply against
What it costs to mill a tonneUSD 93.75 at the expected premium · USD 97.50 at the one actually paidannual review
Verbatim from the table in the agreement's study: USD 75.00 of treatment plus a premium the mill's owner charges according to how much gold it recovers — USD 15.00 between 70 and 80 %, USD 18.75 between 80 and 85 %, USD 22.50 above 85 %. ⚠️ Actual recovery came in above 85 %, as declared by the mill's owner, so the top step was charged: USD 97.50, not the USD 93.75 this page used to publish.
What it costs to bring the tonneUSD 17.50 per tonne, 165 kmannual review
Also published. In the previous version of this page haulage was an assumed tonne-kilometer rate; it is now a contract price. Our own routing over the open road network gives 160 km for the same pair, so the distance converges by two routes.
Tonnes per year39,342 processed in two months · 450,000 committed over three yearslive data
The contract guaranteed 150,000 tonnes a year and 450,000 over three years. The inaugural campaign processed 39,342 tonnes and closed on 30 June 2026 — both parties publish the same figure. ⚠️ The 15,000 tonnes this page used to publish were only the ones that fed the first pour, not the campaign.
How much life the contract has leftterminated with effect from 1 October 2026; the campaign had closed on 30 Junelive data
The plan was 33 months from May 2026. Two were completed: the inaugural campaign processed 39,342 tonnes and closed on 30 June. On 13 August the client announced the transition to its own plant and on 10 September it withdrew the validity of the study. The contract was terminated with effect from 1 October 2026. It was the uncomfortable fact of this niche and it came true in four months, not in three years.

The number rests on a few variables. The formula shows how it moves when each one changes; and each variable carries its freshness seal — how often it is worth revisiting. estim

How solid the number is verif

This market had a single contract that we know of in the country, and that contract has ended. It is not us saying it — it is the issuer:

whenwhich document, and what it says
13 August 2026Challenger Gold announces to the market *«a disciplined transition away from the current third-party plant treatment model»*
9 September 2026Austral Gold, owner of the mill, confirms that the replacement *«is under discussion»* and that it will inform the market *«if and when a binding agreement is signed»*
10 September 2026Challenger states that the projections of its own 2025 toll-milling study *«are superseded and should no longer be relied upon»*
11 September 2026its half-year accounts write off in full the right of use of the plant: recoverable value nil, A$4,678,199 charged to profit and loss
2 October 2026Austral Gold announces that the two companies terminated the toll-milling contract with effect from 1 October 2026, and that they continue to discuss in good faith a possible agreement for Casposo to buy ore from Hualilán
⇒ That is why this page does not publish a market size. There is no contract to annualise against, and the business that would replace it —buying the ore instead of charging to mill it— is not signed and is a different business: the mill's owner would take on exposure to the metal price.What does remain, because it is the only durable thing the case left behind: the tariff. It is published in a table, in dollars per wet tonne processed, in the study the miner itself filed with the Australian market in June 2025 — and it is the only published toll-milling price we found in the region. Verbatim: treatment USD 75.00 per wet tonne · recovery premium USD 15.00 between 70 and 80 % of gold recovered, USD 18.75 between 80 and 85 %, USD 22.50 above 85 % · right of use of the plant USD 8.06 · ore haulage USD 17.50 over 165 kilometres · general transport and processing expenses USD 13.97 · total USD 133.28 per tonne at a recovery of 84 %. ⚠️ And the premium actually paid was the top step, because the mill's owner declared a recovery *«above 85 %, exceeding the maximum threshold»* of the scale — that is USD 22.50, not USD 18.75.⚠️ And the full inaugural campaign was 39,342 tonnes, not the 15,000 that fed the first pour: both sides give the same figure, against a plan of 450,000 tonnes over three years.

Coverage: the rosters of San Juan's two mining supplier chambers —187 CASEMI members and 40 published by CAPRIMSA, none of which declares grinding— and the documents of both parties to the only toll-milling agreement we identified in the country · Sep 14, 2026 · not reviewed: those rosters are not the universe of supply —in that same province there is a lime works with four kilns that appears in neither of the two— and there is no public register listing how many idle grinding and flotation plants there are

How to cite this figure: Despegue (2026). Shared processing capacity: ore toll milling in San Juan · San Juan. despegueargentina.com/en/san-juan/procesamiento-compartido-maquila-mineral · terms of use

Neighbouring markets3 markets in the same group, from USD 4,3 to USD 60 M a year

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Page 1 of the example executive summaryOpen the report ↗A real analysis · a real company, open in full →
Ignacio Aredez
Analysis and curation: Ignacio Aredez
Head of Despegue
Method and track record →
  • 20+ years in technology, 15 of them in data and AI, for clients across Europe and the Americas
  • Certified in AI governance (ISO/IEC 42001)
  • Machine Learning (Google Cloud)
  • Registered expert with the European Commission
How to read the seals →
  verif primary source · prob primary source pending · unconf a source said it · estim our own calculation · thesis our reading · the date belongs to the datum, at the precision its source allows
This is not financial advice. The TAM is an estimate with a transparent method, not an official figure; the framing is labeled as thesis. Every figure carries its source. ← All opportunities in San Juan