Despegue San Juan · supplier NICHE
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up to date · reviewed Aug 30, 2026
San Juan · Casposo-Hualilán · the country's first ore toll milling agreement
The country's first shared processing scheme has already poured gold, and it has one clientthesis

Shared processing capacity: ore toll milling in San Juan

estimated market per year
USD 1.7-3.0 M/yr
estim · Aug 30, 2026midpoint ~USD 2.3 M/yrwindow openemerging arc · The only agreement that exists runs for three years from May 2026 with its volume committed, and its client has already published the study for its own plant: when it builds it, the market is left without a client again. The real window is not that contract — it is the small deposits that still have nowhere to take their ore, and that one opens as the exploration of Del Carmen and Jagüelito, awarded in October 2025 with USD 56 million committed, confirms or rules out.

It started milling in May 2026 and in June out came 200 kilos of doré. The interesting part is not the gold: it is whose plant it is. Challenger Gold put its Hualilán deposit into production in another miner's mill —Casposo, of Austral Gold, idle since 2019 and rehabilitated with USD 7 million—, with 150,000 tonnes a year guaranteed over three years. It is the first ore toll milling agreement between miners in Argentina. And the number that explains it all is the comparison: starting this way cost USD 8.9 million of initial capital; its own plant asks for USD 232 million. The same deposit enters production with 26 times less capital. On the other side, the province has ore waiting: Del Carmen declares 366,000 ounces of gold equivalent and has nowhere to mill them.

What the market is made of

This split is different from every other in the observatory, and it is worth saying why. Today San Juan's toll milling service is entirely captive: there is one plant providing it and one client, on a three-year contract. What is addressable is not that contract: it is the ore that still has nowhere to go.

Ore freight (the only quantifiable part)USD 2.3 M · 100%
Toll milling under the current contractUSD 0 M · 0%
Toll milling of the ore without a plantUSD 0 M · 0%
Ore freight (the only quantifiable part)USD 2.3 M100%your market
the guaranteed volume travelling 165 km of paved road between the deposit and the plant: some 24.75 million tonne-kilometers a year, at the paved trunk tariff
Toll milling under the current contractUSD 0 M0%non-addressable
not quantified: there is no public tariff, and besides it is captive — one plant and one client, with the volume committed for three years
Toll milling of the ore without a plantUSD 0 M0%your market
also not quantified in dollars, but its physical size is known: 366,000 ounces of gold equivalent declared at Del Carmen, plus the Hualilán satellites, Jagüelito and the Calingasta veins
The only block with a defensible price is freight. The toll milling service is not quantified for lack of a public tariff, and that is why it does not appear as a bar. estim

Why this market exists

The underlying policy that opens up this demand. It is the same inference declared by the rules and the program pillars pushing in this direction.

the RIGI promise is kept

The engine · what generates this demand

This market does not float on its own: concrete megaprojects drive it. These are the ones moving demand for this niche — each with its investment and status.

Reactivation and deepening of the Gualcamayo gold and silver mine (San Juan): the 'Deep Carbonates (DCP)' project extends the mine life toward the sulfide orebody at depth…

see the project →

Engineering, construction, operation and maintenance of new leach pads (phases 8 and 9) at Veladero Mine, to sustain gold production and exports…

see the project →

The niche in depth

Who splits the market, where you get in, what pays and what could break it.

Who is
already in
Market
split
Casposo (Austral Gold, Elsztain group) — the only current provider100% of the existing market

It rehabilitated with USD 7 M a plant idle since 2019 and turned it into the country's first toll milling business, with an anchor client and a guaranteed annual volume. It charged for its mill, not for its reserves. As long as it is the belt's only available mill, it sets the price.

The client's own planttakes the market when the deposit grows

It is the trade's structural competitor: toll milling is for starting, not for staying. Challenger has already published the PFS of its own plant — USD 232 M of startup capital for twelve years of production prob. When the deposit justifies the investment, the client leaves. A toll milling business is built on client rotation, not on loyalty.

The plants of the large gold operationsidle capacity that is not offered

Veladero and Gualcamayo have processing infrastructure at scale, but their circuit is valley and heap leaching, not grinding and flotation of high-grade veins: it is not the same service and it does not work for the same ore. Capacity exists in the province; compatible capacity is a different thing.

Modular plants and mobile crushingno local supply yet

It is the shape the market would take if someone built it: modular grinding and flotation, mobile crushing, and toll milling contracts for the belt's small deposits. There is no installed local supply today — the provincial analysis itself declares it a gap.

The gap · how to get in

This niche's gap is not about service: it is about the asset. What San Juan lacks is grinding and flotation capacity available to third parties, and it is worth saying why the large plants do not cover it:

1

Installed capacity is not compatible capacity. Veladero and Gualcamayo process at scale, but they leach: in valleys and in heaps. The toll milling this market calls for is grinding and flotation of high-grade veins. Counting the province's capacity without separating circuits gives a number that means nothing.

2

The viable shape is probably not another fixed plant. A plant is sunk long-term capital against rotating demand —the good client leaves when it grows—. Modular grinding and mobile crushing move to the ore instead of waiting for the ore to come, and there is no installed local supply today.

3

An idle asset is not scrap. That is the lesson of this case: Casposo was out of service since 2019, was rehabilitated with USD 7 million and became the country's only provider. It charged for its mill, not for its reserves.

4

And the barrier that is not technical: entering means quoting blind. With no public tariff, the newcomer sets a price against an incumbent who already knows it and does not say it.

Non-addressable

The entire service today: Casposo is the only plant providing toll milling in the province and holds the only contract that exists, with the volume committed for three years. While that agreement lasts, the San Juan toll milling market is not addressable.

Your market

USD 1.7-3.0 M/yr of ore freight, plus toll milling for the deposits that today have nowhere to go — not quantified for lack of a public tariff, but whose physical size is known: Del Carmen declares 366,000 ounces of gold equivalent, and to that add the Hualilán satellites, Jagüelito and the Calingasta veins.

Your realistic wedge

The realistic entry is not buying a plant: it is mobile crushing and modular grinding, which move to the ore and do not demand the sunk capital of a fixed plant. There is no installed local supply.

The published TAM is only the freight of one origin-destination pair. The toll milling service —the large block— is not quantified because there is no public tariff, and that is verified in the two primary sources of the agreement, not assumed.
Plants providing toll milling in San Juan
one
Clients using it
one only
Declared ore with no plant
366,000 ounces of gold equivalent at Del Carmen, plus satellites
Published toll milling tariff
none
When you get paid, and what blocks it
IT PAYS TODAY, but through a single client. The agreement between Hualilán and Casposo guarantees that volume for three years, began processing on 1 May 2026 and produced its first gold pour in June. Commercial model: multi-year contract with guaranteed capacity, which is the opposite of a spot deal and that is why it is worth something — the client secures milling and the provider secures throughput. What is not known is the price: neither of the two primary sources of the agreement publishes it. The payer is first-tier and collection is tied to production, not to a promise.
Spillover
effect
For the people

It is the niche that carries furthest the idea that an idle asset is not scrap: Casposo had been out of service since 2019, was rehabilitated with USD 7 million and its restart sustains more than 300 jobs, 99% from San Juan. The trades are plant trades and among the best paid in provincial mining —mill operator, flotation operator, mechanical and electrical plant maintenance, process control, laboratory— and they are perpetual as long as there is ore to grind, unlike construction jobs. And there is a second-order effect that is the whole argument: every toll milling agreement turns a small deposit, which alone did not justify a plant, into an operation that employs and buys. Symmetric risk, stated plainly: employment at a toll milling plant depends on it finding the next client when the current one builds its own, and today the market has one seller and one buyer. thesis

How we
calculate it
THIS NUMBER IS DELIBERATELY INCOMPLETE, AND THAT IS THE CONCLUSION. The toll milling service —charging to grind someone else's ore— has no public tariff in Argentina, and that is not a suspicion: we searched the two primary sources of the only agreement that exists and neither publishes it. The article announcing the first gold pour gives the volume, the doré and the ounces, and gives no processing fee and no cost per tonne. The one carrying the economics of the alternative route does not even mention the agreement. ⇒ The TAM of the toll milling service is not quantified. We quantify what does have a price and declare the rest, instead of inventing the tariff and publishing a number nobody can audit.What is sealed, and it is the fact that orders everything: *«The toll processing agreement with Casposo Argentina Mining provides Challenger with an annual guaranteed processing capacity of 150,000 tonnes over three years — a total of 450,000 tonnes committed»* verif primary source opened and read first-hand. It is the country's first shared processing scheme between miners.THE FIGURE THAT CHANGES THE DECISION, AND IT IS NOT A TAM. Challenger started producing gold with USD 8.9 M of initial capital prob own survey using a third party's plant. Its own plant —the alternative route, with its published PFS, which we opened and read— asks for USD 232 M of startup capital *(«The project will require $232-million in startup capital for production of 105 000 oz in year one and year two, followed by 12 years of production averaging 135 000 oz/y»)*. The same deposit enters production with 26 times less capital. That is what toll milling sells, and it is why this niche exists.(A) WHAT IS QUANTIFIED — the ore freight the scheme creates. A toll milling agreement moves ore that was not moving before: those tonnes travel 165 km of paved road between Hualilán and the Casposo plant prob own survey. That is 24.75 M tonne-kilometers a year × 0.07-0.12 USD/t-km of paved trunk [own assumption, the same range used by the Catamarca logistics entry] = USD 1.7-3.0 M/yr, midpoint ~USD 2.3 M/yr. It is the only block with a defensible price, and it is a single origin-destination pair.(B) THE TOLL MILLING SERVICE — not quantified, and here is why. 🔴 With no public tariff there is no auditable number. What can be said with data is the physical size of the market: the guaranteed volume of a single client, and nothing more. And what can be said about the margin is where it comes from: Casposo rehabilitated with USD 7 M a plant that had been idle since 2019 prob and turned it into a business with an anchor client. It charged for its mill, not for its reserves.(C) THE CEILING, IN ORE WITHOUT A PLANT AND NOT IN DOLLARS. What defines how far this can grow is not a price projection: it is how much ore has nowhere to be milled. Del Carmen declares 366,000 ounces of gold equivalent and has no plant prob; its re-tender was awarded in Oct-2025 with USD 56 M of exploration committed over three years and an option to mine. Add the Hualilán satellites, Jagüelito and the Calingasta veins. The province has more ore than mills, and that is the market fact.PUBLISHED TAM: USD 1.7-3.0 M/yr (midpoint ~USD 2.3 M/yr), and it is ONLY the ore freight of one pair. The large block —toll milling— stays declared and unquantified. A bigger TAM would be more sellable and less true.What is NOT in the number (no double counting): (1) gold and silver production itself, which belongs to the miner and not to the service provider. (2) Hualilán's drilling and blasting, already counted by the province's blasting and explosives entry. (3) Personnel transport, which has its own entry. (4) The PFS economics of the toll milling deal —76,789 oz of gold and 339,530 of silver over 30 months, with a projected EBITDA of USD 195 M at USD 2,500/oz— is expressly left out: our own survey flagged it `sin_confirmar` because it does not reconcile with later communications citing USD 88 M of EBITDA at USD 3,300/oz for one phase. We do not build on a figure our own auditor left in doubt.

Concentration It is the most concentrated market in the observatory, and in the strangest way: there is one seller and one buyer. Casposo is the only plant providing the service and Challenger the only client. That does two things at once: it gives the seller pricing power no other niche has, and it makes it fragile, because when that client builds its own plant the market goes back to zero. Potential demand, by contrast, is atomized: the belt's small deposits, each too small to justify its own plant and all of them together enough to fill several.

Who really pays?

This market has two possible clients and they are not the same business:

If you sellThird-party ore grinding with guaranteed capacity
The miner with a deposit and no plant prob · Jun 1, 2026

It is the contract that already exists, and it processes from 1 May 2026 with the first gold pour in June. What the client buys is not milling: it is entering production without putting up the capital of a plant.

If you sellOre freight between the deposit and the plant
The same miner, and it is the part that does have a market price prob · Oct 21, 2025

The guaranteed volume travels 165 km of paved road. It is a market that did not exist before: the toll milling agreement created it, because ore processed at its own deposit does not travel.

If you sellModular grinding and mobile crushing
The belt's small deposits, which are not clients yet prob · May 18, 2026

Del Carmen declares 366,000 ounces of gold equivalent with no plant and its re-tender was awarded in October 2025 with USD 56 million of exploration committed over three years. Add the Hualilán satellites, Jagüelito and the Calingasta veins. There is no local supply to serve them today.

The difference between the first two doors and the third is time: the first two bill today and have a single client; the third is bigger and depends on exploration confirming.

What we watch · when to enter

This is not «what breaks it»: it is the dashboard for entering at the right moment. And here the indicator is uncomfortable, because what closes the market is the client's success.

Leading indicator prob · May 18, 2026
The investment decision on Hualilán's own plant · the pre-feasibility study is already published: USD 232 M of startup capital

Toll milling is for starting, not for staying. The client that today sustains the country's only contract has already published the study for its own plant —1.5 million tonnes a year of flotation plus an 8 million tonne heap leach circuit— and its feasibility study is under way. The day it takes the investment decision, the toll milling contract ends and the market is left without a client. What has to be watched in parallel, and is what would replace it, is the exploration of Del Carmen and Jagüelito: awarded in October 2025 with USD 56 million committed over three years and an option to mine. If it confirms, the next feed appears; if not, the market depends on a single contract.

The watchlist · what signals the game has changed
The good client leaves when it grows (permanent — the trade's structural killer)

Toll milling is for starting, not for staying. Challenger has already published the study for its own plant: USD 232 million of startup capital for twelve years of sustained production prob. The day the deposit justifies that investment, the toll milling contract ends. A business like this is built on client rotation, not on loyalty.

There is no public tariff, so you quote blind

We searched the two primary sources of the country's only agreement and neither publishes a processing fee or a cost per tonne. Anyone wanting to enter has to set a price against an incumbent who already knows it and does not say it. It is this niche's declared gap and it is not filled with a guess.

Installed capacity is not compatible capacity

Veladero and Gualcamayo have processing infrastructure at scale, but they leach: in valleys and in heaps. The toll milling this market calls for is grinding and flotation of high-grade veins. Counting the province's capacity without separating circuits gives a number that means nothing.

It is sunk capital against rotating demand

A fixed plant amortizes over years and its client base changes. That is why the viable shape is probably not another plant, but modular grinding and mobile crushing, which move to the ore.

Small ore depends on someone exploring it first

Del Carmen and Jagüelito were re-tendered in October 2025 with USD 56 million of exploration committed over three years and an option to mine. Until that exploration confirms, future toll milling demand is a thesis, not a pipeline.

How the number is built · and how fresh each data point is

This niche's model is not a revenue formula: it is a capital comparison. It is what decides whether a small deposit enters production or stays on paper.

starting in a third party plant: USD 8.9 M of initial capital  ·  against building its own: USD 232 M of startup capital per its own study=26 times less capital to put the same deposit into production. That is the product an idle-capacity plant sells — and the freight it generates, the only quantifiable part here, is USD 1.7-3.0 M/yr for a single origin-destination pair
Tonnes guaranteed per year150,000, with 450,000 committed over three yearsannual review
Verbatim from the announcement of the agreement, read first-hand: guaranteed annual processing capacity of 150,000 tonnes over three years.
Capital to start via toll millingUSD 8.9 Mannual review
Own survey from the research phase. It is the initial capital the producer needed to start with no plant of its own.
Capital for its own plantUSD 232 M of startup capitalannual review
Verbatim from the published pre-feasibility study, read first-hand: 232 million of startup capital for 105,000 ounces in years 1 and 2, then twelve years averaging 135,000 ounces a year.
Toll milling tariffnot publiclive data
We searched both primary sources of the agreement and neither publishes it. It is the missing figure and the one that would decide the business: it is declared rather than estimated.

The number rests on a few variables. The formula shows how it moves when each one changes; and each variable carries its freshness seal — how often it is worth revisiting. estim

How we validate this figure

How solid the number is estim

Here we did something unusual: we deliberately left the main number uncalculated. The toll milling service —charging to grind someone else's ore— has no public tariff in Argentina, and we are not guessing: we went to the two primary sources of the only agreement that exists and neither publishes the price. The article announcing the first pour gives the volume verbatim, the doré and the ounces, and gives no processing fee and no cost per tonne; the one carrying the economics of the standalone plant does not even mention the agreement. So the price gap is verified by absence in the source, not assumed — and the service TAM is not quantified. What this page does quantify is the ore freight, the only block with a defensible price, and what it does measure in physical units is the market: how many tonnes move and how much ore has no plant. And we expressly leave out the deal's projected economics, because our own survey flagged them as unreconciled: two communications from the same company give results that do not add up. A bigger number would be more sellable and less true.

How to cite this figure: Despegue (2026). Shared processing capacity: ore toll milling in San Juan · San Juan. despegueargentina.com/en/san-juan/procesamiento-compartido-maquila-mineral · terms of use

COMING SOON
Your company against this trade

There are 5 RIGI projects in San Juan that will buy from this trade, and each one opens its window in a different phase. You already have 4 named competitors on this page. Everything we publish here is public and complete. What we are building is what no listing gives you: in what order they will need it, when each phase opens its window, what you need certified before knocking, and who is already inside.

It is built per company, not a generic PDF. Leave us your details and we will tell you when it is ready.

How to read the seals →   verif primary source · prob primary source pending · unconf not sufficiently backed · estim our own calculation · thesis our reading
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This is not financial advice. The TAM is an estimate with a transparent method, not an official figure; the framing is labeled as thesis. Every figure carries its source. All opportunities in San Juan