Despegue ← San Juan OPPORTUNITY
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San Juan · Mining cordillera · energy, transmission and solar
The grid is already divided up for 25 years; what remains open is building itthesis

Energy and transmission for the copper wave (+ mining solar, San Juan)

Estimated entry range for a supplier
USD 10-30 M/year
Estimated market: USD 300-550 M/yr in the 2026-2030 window, adjusted midpoint ~350-450 M/yr
up to date · reviewed Sep 14, 2026
estim Jul 19, 2026urgent demandour reading
At a glance
Who buys
The company that builds the physical works — not the mine thesis
the 4 doors →
In which projects
Los Azules, Vicuña · and 1 more not yet approved
what each one invests →
When
The trunk line permit was resolved on 28 July 2026 and the physical works have no published award. The other clock: Los Azules picks its engineering and construction contractor in the fourth quarter of 2026 and decides the investment in mid-2027. thesis
what to watch and where it stands →
The main barrier
Certifiable track record at 500 kV and in works above 3,500 metres: among the San Juan firms bidding in the operator's tenders we found none with 500 kV work. Whoever gets in sells works and services, not energy. thesis
the whole entry map →
Where you get in
Do not go after the 500 kV trunk line or the sale of power, which demand capital, a license and a balance sheet; maintenance of the two substations has already been assigned by the resolution. Enter through what is executed in-territory, where the filter is proven capability and not size:
the 4 routes →

The electricity demand brought by the three copper projects exceeds San Juan's entire solar fleet: the 2030 scenario that one of them filed before the regulator adds up to 700 MW of new demand, and the owner of the largest projects 620 MW of operating load and up to 738 MW of peak on its own, in a province that has 501.1 MW of solar in operation. To serve it, the trunk is already settled: on 28 July 2026 the regulator rejected all the objections —those of Barrick, Los Azules, the provincial electricity authority, La Rioja's Secretaría de Energía and the municipalities of Iglesia, Jáchal and Calingasta— and ratified for 25 years Vicuña's priority over 90 % of the existing line's remaining capacity —71 % of its total capacity— and over 90 % of the new line. ⛔ And that same resolution tied up part of the business: operation and maintenance of the two new substations is Transener's by regulation. What remains open is not selling energy over the grid: it is building it — 167 kilometres of 500 kV, 93 of 220, a substation in gas-insulated switchgear, and the cadastral survey and the easement over the 500 kV route.

verif primary sourceestim our own calculationthesis our readingHow to read all five →

What the market is made of

The TAM is activity, not capturable spoils. The 500 kV trunk was applied for by Transener before ENRE and is paid by Vicuña, the Los Azules electrical solution would be integrated by a generator, according to the press, and the already-installed generators share the long-term power purchase agreements: that is captive. Your real gap is what is executed in-territory —the civil works and erection of lines and substations, the 33 kV networks, the works and erection of the solar and the maintenance—: the addressable segment.

How it splits, and against which total
Midpoint of the captive/addressable split over the construction-window TAM, center ~USD 400 M/year (2026-2030). Our own estimate derived from the funnel, not a new figure. estim
CaptiveUSD 260 M · 65%
Addressable (SAM)USD 140 M · 35%
CaptiveUSD 260 M65%non-addressable
the main contractor's margin on the 500 kV trunk (the large builder that wins the physical works), a generator's integrated solution at Los Azules, the long-term power purchase agreements of the already-installed generators and the imported equipment (450-600 MVA transformers, panels, inverters, conductors)
Addressable (SAM)USD 140 M35%addressable
the civil works and electromechanical erection of lines and substations (35-45% of transmission investment), the local works and erection of the solar, the 33/132 kV networks, construction power rental and maintenance — where the Local Development Law pushes
Non-addressable

~60-75% of the window TAM (USD 200-400 M/yr): the margin of the trunk's main contractor (the large builder that wins the physical works), a generator-integrator's integrated solution, incumbent generators' long-term power purchase agreements, and imported equipment (450-600 MVA transformers, conductors, panels, trackers, inverters). Risk: an integrated foreign builder with financing enlarges the captive share via the law's 'competitive market terms' valve (it already happened in camps: USD 52 M vs 70 M).

Addressable share

USD 100-190 M/yr addressable by a local/national entrant: civil works and erection of lines/substations (35-45% of transmission investment), the works and erection of a solar farm (25-35% of solar investment), 33/132 kV networks, construction power rental and operation and maintenance.

See the full breakdown
The Local Mining Development Law (80% employment / 60% procurement, RE.PRO.MIN still unregulated and with no legal deadline) pushes the part the mining company buys —site networks and the 220 kV line, which Vicuña contracts— and does not protect against the price gap. Whether it also reaches the trunk's physical works depends on who contracts them, which is not published: if Vicuña, which says it finances and develops them, contracts them, they fall within its purchases; if Transener contracts them on its own, they may fall outside the 60 % thesis. estim
Entry range for a supplier

USD 10-30 M/yr, and the arithmetic is in plain sight: the entrant does not take the trunk. It takes the 33 kV networks and the site electrification already being tendered —tickets of USD 1 to 8 million, seven bidders in July 2026— and construction power, which the technical study itself sizes at five 2 MW generator sets to start and three more in stage 3, with high-altitude power rental on 12 to 36 month contracts. Adding the two doors gives that band. estim

▸ Leverage, not a guarantee. ⛔ And there is a limit in the data worth stating head-on: the resolution assigns Transener the operation and maintenance of the new Rodeo and Chaparro substations, «extending its jurisdiction up to the 220 kV and 132 kV line exit gantries» (art. 9), and orders the power-line easement for the certified works to be established in its favour (art. 10), but designates no operator for the line. Vicuña says that the finished works pass to the national grid and are managed by the transmission concessionaire, and an official of the national regulator told the press that Transener will operate and maintain the facilities and supervise all the works prob; the act that would set this for the line is not yet published.

Who really pays?

The obvious name —“the mine pays for the energy”— hides four distinct flows, and in mining energy you almost never sell to the operator: you sell to whoever builds the trunk or whoever generates the energy. Knowing which is your door is the first step:

If you sellCivil works and electromechanical erection of the 500 kV trunk (foundations, stringing, on the order of 400 towers estim of the 167 km extra-high-voltage line)
→
The company that builds the physical works — not the mine thesis prob Jul 29, 2026 ↗

Transener filed the expansion before the regulator at Vicuña's request (Resolución ENReGE 330/2026) verif, and Vicuña finances it entirely with its own resources verif. The resolution assigns Transener the operation and maintenance of the new Rodeo and Chaparro substations (article 9) and orders the power-line easement for the certified works to be established in its favour (article 10), but names no operator for the line verif. Who contracts the physical works is not published unconf: that is where the civil-works and erection contractor comes in, probably in a joint venture with a national builder thesis.

If you sellThe integrated electrical solution for Los Azules (HV line + energy)
→
The generator-integrator — not McEwen directly thesis Oct 7, 2025

The Los Azules Feasibility defines its need for a high-voltage line; the press points to a generator as the integrator that designs, builds and finances it against a long-term power purchase agreement. Whoever it is, you sell to the integrator, not to the mine.

If you sellThe construction, erection and maintenance of mining-destined solar farms: earthworks, foundations, mechanical erection and connection
→
The generator that sells energy to the miner under a long-term contract — not the miner thesis prob May 2025 ↗

The mine buys the energy from the generator on the term market, and the works, erection and maintenance contractor sells to the generator, not to the mine thesis. There is already a new solar farm with an explicit mining focus: Genneia San Juan Sur, 130 MW and USD 110 M, for large users of the term market verif; and for Los Azules the press names a generator-integrator prob.

If you sell33/132 kV networks and site electrification (the SME door)
→
The operator, directly — Vicuña tenders its distribution electrical works prob Jul 13, 2026 ↗

Vicuña already tendered the expansion of the 33 kV distribution and the electrical system for Phase 2 of the camp, with seven large bidders, four of them from San Juan (July 2026); here the local entrant sells to the operator with no intermediary. The private-use 220 kV line up to the mine verif is also contracted by Vicuña.

▸
The lesson: in mining energy you almost never sell to the mine. You sell to whoever builds the trunk (the builder that wins the physical works), to whoever integrates the solution (the generator-integrator) or to whoever generates the energy (the solar farm's owner) — and only the site networks are paid by the operator directly. Knocking on the wrong door means losing the contract.

Which projects move this demand

USD 9,700 M Jun 16, 2026 ↗

The largest mining project in Argentine history by announced investment, and, according to the operator…

see the project →
USD 2,672 M Oct 14, 2025 ↗

Leach-based copper cathode project in Calingasta (San Juan). Company/press figures (probable, outside the resolution)…

see the project →
USD 9,500 M Aug 18, 2025 ↗

Phase 1 of one of Argentina's two largest undeveloped copper deposits, alongside Vicuña: a resource declared by Glencore of ~6,000 Mt @ 0.43% Cu, 2.2 g/t Ag and 130 g/t Mo…

see the project →

When the window opens

The cordillera's electrical works are decided by administrative act and executed by private tender. The trunk line permit was resolved on 28 July 2026: 167 kilometres of 500 kV line between Rodeo and Chaparro, a new 450 MVA gas-insulated substation, a 600 MVA bank at Rodeo and the disconnection of the existing line. What is left to award is the physical works, which the resolution does not allocate, plus the 93 kilometres of double-circuit 220 kV line to Josemaría, which the Secretaría de Energía authorised on 5 August 2026 as a private-use line of Vicuña. ⛔ What is no longer open is the maintenance of the two new substations: the resolution assigns it to Transener under the single-operator criterion, up to the outgoing gantries. And there are two more clocks. Los Azules decides its investment in mid-2027 and picks its engineering and construction contractor earlier, in the fourth quarter of 2026. For its power connection it submitted two alternatives in June 2026: entering San Juan's 500 kV grid through the Rodeo and Calingasta substations, or its own 220 kV line from Mendoza prob Tiempo de San Juan, 26 June 2026. And the large project's demand does not end at the 260 MW authorised: its own report projects 220 MW operating in the first stage, 295 in the second and up to 620 MW in total, with a peak of 738. ⚠️ That each step reopens the procedure is our own reading of how the expansion regime works, not something the resolution says. These four numbers say how much is left and who is going to buy it.

What to watchWhat changes when it happensStatus
The authorised megawatts against the projected megawatts
Every time demand exceeds what is authorised there is a new expansion, and with it new works and another procedure.
the owner projects for stage 1 a load of 220 MW operating with a peak of 260; 295 MW operating in stage 2 and up to 620 MW in total, with a peak of 738 — and stage 3 adds a second bank at Chaparro, a new 220 kV line and another 500 kV line of some 368 kilometres to La Rioja Sur verif Mar 2026 ↗
The operator's electrical tenders
It is the SME door, and the only one that opens visibly in this category.
July 2026 round with two tenders —the expansion of 33 kV distribution within the camp and the electrical system for Phase 2 of the new camp—, with seven large bidders, four of them from San Juan.
See the evidence
No award published as of 14 September 2026
prob Jul 13, 2026 ↗
The solar farms operating in the province
It measures whether local generation grows at the pace of mining demand, and whether competition for the energy contracts appears.
501.1 MW in operation and 785.61 MW awarded and in force across 25 projects, according to the provincial energy authority.
See the evidence
⚠️ The source does not declare a cut-off date, and the same body published on 12 August 2026 that 22 farms are generating: two unreconciled counts
verif Sep 14, 2026 ↗
The cost of energy in the project's own accounts
It is the price against which any generation proposal is measured.
USD 65 per megawatt-hour, a stated assumption in the technical study for the operating cost calculation.
See the evidence
and USD 0.10 per kilowatt-hour on the Chilean side, which the document itself says is more expensive
verif Mar 2026 ↗
What signals the game has changed
Delay of Vicuña's final investment decision

The entire ~USD 800 M package (extra-high-voltage line included) hangs on Lundin-BHP's final investment decision, which the company places «as early as the end of 2026»; without a final investment decision there is no contract between the parties to execute. Timing 2026-2027.

A drop in the copper price

It re-sequences the portfolio: El Pachón (no RIGI approval and no environmental report filed —the company aims to file it in the first half of 2027—; 300 MW = 43% estim of the 2030 scenario's demand) is the most exposed thesis.

See the evidence
Los Azules (19.8% IRR verif release of the Los Azules feasibility study, Oct-2025) the most sensitive to cost of capital thesis. It hits the 2029-2034 tail more than the 2026-2028 core.
Litigation over grid access (the administrative route is now closed)

ENReGE 330/2026 (BO 29-Jul-2026, art. 1) rejected the eleven objections filed: EPRE San Juan, La Rioja's Secretaría de Energía, the municipalities of Calingasta, Jáchal and Iglesia, a private individual, Barrick Exploraciones, Minera Argentina del Sol, Golden Mining (Hualilán), Casposo and Andes Corporación Minera verif full articles read in the Boletín Oficial.

See the evidence
Barrick and Minera Argentina del Sol claimed access of up to 250 MW for the companies' contributions to the corridor, and the provincial electricity regulator reserved the right to go to court verif considerandos of Resolución ENReGE 330/2026. What remains alive is no longer the administrative claim but the judicial one, and Barrick, which loses the most capacity, has the greatest incentive to file it thesis our own reading of the incentive: we have no record of an appeal filed as of the Aug-2026 cutoff. Timing 2026-2028.
PowerChina-style import

An integrated Chinese main contractor (line + solar + financing) shrinks the local SAM via the 'competitive market terms' valve — a precedent already consummated in camps. Each award 2026-2028.

See the remaining 2 risks
Water/glaciers reignite the conflict

Josemaría's DIA approved (Mar-2026), but its own consultant rates the impact as «severe during operation in the well-field sector» —on the basin from which the water will be drawn— and expects it to ease once desalinated Pacific water comes in prob press on the provincial environmental file; the DEAM primary source was not located.

See the evidence
'Jáchal No Se Toca' is still active. A La Rioja-style injunction (Apr-2026) against the electrical works is plausible thesis. Continuous, peaking during construction.
Window structure

The works are a 2026-2030 window (peak 2027-2029): whoever enters only to build is left with no market in 2030. The insurance is to chain to the perpetual core (energy sales for 25+ years + operation and maintenance).

The opportunity in depth

How to get inthe gap and the routes that open it
1

Start with the 33 and 132 kV networks and site electrification, which the operator is already tendering —two parallel tenders with seven bidders in July 2026—: it is the SME door and the track record to move up in voltage.

2

As a subcontractor for civil works and electromechanical erection to the trunk awardee: foundations, service roads and the stringing of a 167 kilometre line that is of the order of four hundred towers by our count. The 93 kilometres of 220 kV up to the mine are a different purchase: the line is for private use and Vicuña contracts it directly. The lesson of the road-works termination rules — the shortcut is a joint venture with a national builder to inherit a high-voltage track record.

3

⭐ The cadastral survey and the electricity-line easement. Article 10 of the resolution obliges Vicuña to process, for the works in the certificate, the survey plans and the constitution of the administrative electricity-line easement, with its registration in the property registry, in Transener's favour. That is the route of the 500 kV line, some 167 kilometres: land surveying, title management and registration, with very little capital and a great deal of local knowledge.

4

Chain towards construction power rental and line and solar-asset maintenance, which is the revenue that annualises and survives the end of the construction. The technical study itself sizes it: construction starts with five 2 MW diesel generator sets and in stage 3 three more are added.

What you needcapital, certification, tax regime and who pays
The works pay against a progress certificate. What it takes to come in through the door:
Capital
For 33 kV networks and erection subcontracts, tickets of USD 1-8 M (our ranges); for extra-high-voltage line civil-works packages, USD 5-30 M with working capital for 30-90 day payments. Banks take the mining contract as collateral; construction power rental requires an owned or financed fleet.
Technical capability
The real bottleneck: certifiable track records of live-line erection and of work at +3,500 masl that we did not identify among the local SMEs bidding in the tenders. The proven shortcut is a joint venture with a national builder to qualify at 500 kV.
Regime
Qualification in the operator's supplier portal (a 1-15 day process) + RE.PRO.MIN once it operates —the law sets no deadline for regulating it—: a company with a majority of San Juan capital or a principal establishment of its own in the province to score under the Local Mining Development Law, with a transferable tax credit certificate that pays the buyer for choosing local.
Who pays
The trunk is paid by Vicuña —it says so itself: it finances it with its own resources, without passing the cost on to the user, and when the works are finished it passes to the national system and is administered by the transmission concessionaire—; the in-territory works are paid by the contractor or the generator. They are two different sales. And its 90 % priority of use does not start today: the 25 years are counted from the commercial commissioning of each work, so the capacity stays committed well beyond the construction window.
▸ You tell us where to see what your company does and we tell you whether we see a sign that it fits this opportunity, with the evidence behind it. See if my company fits this opportunity →
When you get paid, and what blocks it
It pays TODAY, with no dead gap: Vicuña is already tendering electrical works (33 kV + camp Phase II, 7 bidders, Jul-2026), Genneia is already building San Juan Sur (H2-2026) and Los Azules picks its engineering and construction contractor in Q4-2026 and decides its investment in mid-2027. The only gating event for the large package is Vicuña's final investment decision («as early as the end of 2026», per the company), which triggers the main contractor for the extra-high-voltage line. Commercial model: works subcontracts with monthly certificates (small entrant), a contract between the parties with ENRE/Transener (trunk), a 10-25 year long-term power purchase agreement (generation), a monthly per-kW rate (construction power rental). Real bottleneck: (1) qualification at the operator's supplier window (1-15 days) and RE.PRO.MIN (unregulated and with no legal deadline) + high-voltage technical track record that we did not identify among the local SMEs bidding → the shortcut is a joint venture with a national main contractor; (2) working capital (30-90 day payment, expensive equipment — the Semisa-Terusi precedent); (3) altitude: an effective works window of ~7-8 months/year above 3,500 masl, acclimatised people scarce. Time to first invoice: 3-9 months (33 kV/rental/civil subcontract), 12-24 months (extra-high-voltage line packages after the final investment decision), 24-36 months (operation and maintenance of new assets).
Who you compete againstwho is already there and what share they take
Who is
already in
Market
split
Transener S.A.~30-45% of the window investment estim

The party that APPLIED for the expansion before ENRE (Res. ENReGE 330/2026, art. 3), at Vicuña's request and under the Expansions by Contract between the Parties regime —Vicuña is the one paying—.

See the evidence
The resolution assigns it the operation and maintenance of the two new substations (art. 9) and designates no operator for the line; according to Vicuña, the finished works pass to the national grid and are managed by the transmission concessionaire. The resolution does not award the physical works: that is where the market opens.
Generador-integrador de la línea de otro proyecto~20-25% (Los Azules integrated) estim

According to the press, it designs, builds and finances the Los Azules high-voltage line (~3 years) with a 100% renewable long-term power purchase agreement. The USD 400-500 M investment is our own estimate: there is no published figure estim. In June 2026 the project submitted two alternatives for its connection: entering San Juan's 500 kV grid through the Rodeo and Calingasta substations, or its own 220 kV line from Mendoza prob; no award has been published.

Province's leading solar generatorprovincial solar leader (~350 MW of its own, counting San Juan Sur under construction) estim

Ullum I-III 82 MW + Sierras de Ullum 78 + Tocota III 60 prob + San Juan Sur 130 MW/USD 110 M verif (the first farm explicitly 'focused on mining'). By scale, it is a natural candidate for Vicuña's long-term power purchase agreements thesis.

Other generators~200+ MW operational estim

One of them operates the 17 MW Cañada Honda solar farm in San Juan, in Sarmiento verif. They compete for mining long-term power purchase agreements thesis; another already proved the binational model (the Libertadores line to Veladero, 25 MW, USD 54 M, 2022).

See the remaining 3 players
EPSE / Distrocuyo / Naturgy San Juanprovincial operators

State generation / Cuyo trunk transmission (operates the 132 kV network to be reconverted) / distribution.

High-voltage line builders + the threat of an integrated foreign builder0% awarded in SJ to date unconf

Natural candidates to be the main contractor for the extra-high-voltage line after the final investment decision. A Chinese builder already operates in the province (the Batidero camp won on price) and does turnkey lines+solar with financing.

San Juan electrical SMEsmarginal

Four of the seven bidders in Vicuña's two electrical tenders of July 2026 are from San Juan prob; a local LV/MV base. Among those bidding we did not identify a 500 kV track record.

The jobs it createsConstruction jobs: San Juan Sur alone = 300 peak jobs verif. La lectura completa para el que busca trabajo, en la hoja de este nicho para la gente →

How we
calculate it

The number is our own estimate. The calculation, step by step, is below.

The full calculation, step by step
Annualization window: San Juan's EXTENDED one, 2026 → 2030 (÷4.5 years). ⚠️ Two warnings needed to read the figure. (1) It is not the canonical window (2026-2028, the legal deadline of the acts): the extended one is used because the extra-high-voltage line and the transmission works run beyond the committed ring. (2) The divisor is 4.5 years, not 4, so its TAM/year is not strictly comparable with the camps-and-modules niche either, which uses the same window but divides over 4. And RAIL B —energy sold from 2030— is perpetual and sits outside any window: it is opex, not spread capex.Bottom-up on two rails over the 2030 mining demand that Resolución ENRE 219/2026 transcribes from the technical study Los Azules attached to its objection: Vicuña 260 MW + Los Azules 140 MW + El Pachón 300 MW = ~700 MW verif considerandos of Resolución ENRE 219/2026. It is not the regulator's projection: it is an objector's scenario that the regulator quotes. RAIL A (window capex 2026-2030): the Vicuña package — 500 kV extra-high-voltage line Rodeo-Chaparro 167 km + Nueva San Juan-Rodeo reconversion (854 MVA) + Rodeo substation 600 MVA + Chaparro substation 450 MVA = USD 600-800 M (ceiling: the «some 800 million dollars in electrical infrastructure» that an official of the national regulator gave the press on 28 July 2026 prob EconoJournal; floor: bottom-up with benchmarks 167 km × USD 0.9-1.4 M/km + substations + reconversion — benchmarks: AMBA I USD 700-800 M/>500 km, Nueva San Juan-Rodeo USD 105-120 M/165 km in 2018, national plan USD 6,600 M/5,610 km) + Los Azules electrical solution USD 400-500 M estim our own, with no published figure: the press attributes to YPF Luz the design, construction and financing of the line, and in June 2026 the project submitted two alternatives: San Juan's 500 kV line or its own 220 kV connection from Mendoza + new mining solar 400-1,000 MW × USD 0.72-0.85 M/MW (verified anchor: Genneia San Juan Sur 130 MW/USD 110 M; cross-check: El Quemado 305 MW/USD 210-220 M) = USD 300-850 M [stated assumption: cover 30-60% of 2030 mining energy with new local generation] + 33 kV/camp/gold-alternative works USD 40-100 M + Pachón tail in-window USD 50-150 M (the most uncertain: El Pachón has no approved RIGI and has not filed its environmental report, which the company targets for the first half of 2027). Total USD 1,400-2,400 M ÷ 4.5 years = USD 310-535 M/yr. RAIL B (perpetual from 2030): 400 MW (2030) → 700-1,000 MW × load factor 0.85 × USD 55-75/MWh [explicit assumption] = USD 165-225 → 285-555 M/yr + O&M USD 15-30 M/yr. Outside the sum: the ~93 km 220 kV line between Chaparro and Josemaría, for Vicuña's private use (Resolución SE 197/2026), which Vicuña buys directly — an additional floor this calculation does not count. Anti-double-counting: only San Juan mining electrical works/energy; excludes Vaca Muerta, modular camps, roads, and Veladero's Libertadores line (already built, USD 54 M, 2022).

Concentration Very high in the trunk, and now by regulation: the resolution of 28 July 2026 rejected ALL the objections, eleven in total —the provincial electricity authority, La Rioja's Secretaría de Energía, the three mining municipalities, a private individual and five mining companies, among them Barrick and the operator of Los Azules— and ratified for 25 years Vicuña's priority of use over 90 % of the existing line's remaining capacity —71 % of its total capacity— and over 90 % of the new line and substation. The substance of the complaint, verbatim from one of the objections, is that setting a 25-year term «transforms a priority allocation into a material exclusivity over an already-built strategic corridor». Medium in generation. Open in medium and low voltage, civil works and line maintenance: seven large bidders in the two electrical tenders of July 2026, four of them from San Juan. ⛔ And maintenance of the two new substations is no longer open: it is Transener's, under article 9 of that resolution.

The rule that moves it

This niche's driver is provincial: San Juan's Local Mining Development Law reserves part of mining procurement and employment for the local supplier and turns provincial qualification into a competitive advantage for the electrical contractor.

See the underlying reading

The underlying policy that opens up this demand. It is the same inference declared by the rules and the program pillars pushing in this direction.

the RIGI promise is kept + stability → long-term investment
enables
San Juan: 80/60 local mining procurement
See the rule →
It requires 60% of purchases and 80% of mining employment to go to registered San Juan suppliers and workers: it reaches what the mining company buys —site networks, electrification, the 220 kV line Vicuña contracts— and turns the RE.PRO.MIN seal into the key to that quota.
See the full legal grounds
Whether it also reaches the trunk's physical works depends on who contracts them, which is not published: if Vicuña contracts them, they fall within its purchases; if Transener contracts them on its own, they may fall outside the 60 % thesis. The quota does not fall away on price: what the law allows is taking out of the calculation base a purchase with no reasonable local offer, with a reasoned technical justification (art. 9).

Where the number comes from

~USD 165-390 M/yr recurring from 2030, plus USD 15-30 M/yr of operation and maintenance — the revenue that survives the construction wave

See the calculation, the variables and how it was validated

This is the only niche with a perpetual core: when the works end, the sale of energy to the mines is billed for 25 years or more. That recurring engine is built from three variables, and it recalculates just by changing one.

400-700 MW × 8,760 h/year × load factor 0.85 × USD 55-75/MWh=~USD 165-390 M/yr recurring from 2030, plus USD 15-30 M/yr of operation and maintenance
Firm mining demand400 → 700 MWannual review
Vicuña 260 + Los Azules 140 + El Pachón 300 = ~700 MW by 2030: it is the scenario of the technical study Los Azules attached to its objection, and Resolución ENRE 219/2026 transcribes it; ENReGE 330/2026 authorises the 260 MW of the first phase and does not revisit the 700. It starts at ~400 MW (Vicuña phase 1 + Los Azules) and scales with El Pachón and Vicuña's phases 2-3. It moves with each final investment decision.
Load factor0.85structural
A copper mine is a continuous process: it draws power almost 24 hours a day. It is the most stable input in the formula.
Energy priceUSD 55-75/MWhlive data
The range of renewable long-term power purchase agreements backed by the MATER/industrial market 2024-2026 (stated assumption: there is still no San Juan mining power purchase agreement with a public price). It is the variable that moves the figure the most — it will adjust to the first contract with an open price.

The other face —the electrical works of the 2026-2030 window— is not a formula but a sum of packages: Vicuña's trunk (167 km extra-high-voltage line + two substations + reconversion, ~USD 600-800 M), the Los Azules electrical solution (USD 400-500 M by our own estimate, with no published figure; the press attributes the works to YPF Luz), the new mining solar, the 33 kV networks and El Pachón's start — ~USD 1,400-2,400 M in total, ~USD 350-450 M/yr at the peak. That is the face that fills the market today; the perpetual core is what remains afterwards.

The number rests on a few variables. The formula shows how it moves when each one changes; and each variable carries its freshness seal — how often it is worth revisiting. estim

How solid the number is estim

This niche rests on two acts of State from the Official Gazette, and they do different things. Resolución ENRE 219/2026, of April, called the public hearing, and in its considerandos it transcribes the ~700 MW mining-demand scenario for 2030 that Los Azules filed with its objection: an objector's study, not a projection by the regulator. The one that decided is ENReGE 330/2026, of 28 July, published on the 29th, and it settled four things that rule over this market:

what the 28 July resolution decidedwhy it matters here
It rejected all the objections —Barrick, Los Azules, the provincial electricity authority, La Rioja's Secretaría de Energía and the municipalities of Iglesia, Jáchal and Calingasta—the corridor was settled in favour of one party, and the conflict is still alive
It ratified for 25 years the priority of use over 90 % of the existing line's remaining capacity, which according to the market administrator is equivalent to 71 % of its total capacity, and over 90 % of the new line and substation verif arts. 4 to 6 and 8you do not get in to sell energy over that line
It assigned Transener the operation and maintenance of the two new substations, under the single-operator criterion, up to the line exit gantries (art. 9)⛔ it closes the door of trunk line maintenance
It ordered the cadastral survey and the electricity-line easement to be processed for the works in the certificate, in Transener's favour (art. 10)⭐ it opens surveying and registration work along the 500 kV route
And the project's technical study, downloaded and read in full, added the owner's figures that the resolution does not carry: the operating load is 220 MW with a peak of 260 in the first stage, rises by 75 MW in the second to 295 operating and 380 of peak, and the third takes the total to 620 MW operating with a peak of up to 738; the line to the mine is 93 kilometres of 220 kV in double circuit —those 93 kilometres are not in this resolution: the Secretaría de Energía authorised them in Resolución 197/2026—; and construction starts with five 2 MW diesel generator sets, with three more in stage 3.⚠️ The provincial solar fleet goes with the official figure and not with a survey: the provincial energy authority publishes 501.1 MW in operation and 785.61 MW awarded and in force across 25 projects. It goes with two stated reservations: the source does not declare a cut-off date, and the same body published on 12 August 2026 that 22 farms are generating — two counts of its own, unreconciled.On that demand we build the market in two faces: the electrical works of the 2026-2030 window and the perpetual core. Both are our own estimate, and we say so in full: we start from the verified megawatts and apply works ratios, because there is still no San Juan mining contract with a public price. The closest thing to a price is the assumption in the technical study itself: USD 65 per megawatt-hour.

Coverage: the member lists of San Juan's two mining suppliers' chambers —187 members of CASEMI and 40 published by CAPRIMSA— and the seven companies that bid in the operator's two electrical tenders in July 2026 · Sep 14, 2026 · not reviewed: there is no public register of the technical track record of electrical contractors, so it could not be checked what high-voltage track record each of the seven bidders has

How to cite this figure: Despegue (2026). Energy and transmission for the copper wave (+ mining solar, San Juan) · San Juan. despegueargentina.com/en/san-juan/energia-transmision-solar-minero · terms of use

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Ignacio Aredez
Analysis and curation: Ignacio Aredez
Head of Despegue
Method and track record →
  • 20+ years in technology, 15 of them in data and AI, for clients across Europe and the Americas
  • Certified in AI governance (ISO/IEC 42001)
  • Machine Learning (Google Cloud)
  • Registered expert with the European Commission
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