The norm, in detail
The mother law of Vaca Muerta: it sets the 12% royalty since 2004 and forbids the Province from raising taxes on the concession holder
Provincial Law 2453 (passed 03/10/2004, promulgated by Decree 0371/04)
in forcePROVINCIAL
Energy and natural resources
What changed and who it applies to
What changed
It is Neuquén's hydrocarbons framework law: the normative floor on which the entire Vaca Muerta operation is built, and the one that explains where the numbers that later appear in every CENCH decree come from. Five pieces that matter to the investor.(1) Ownership: Art. 1 declares that the liquid and gaseous hydrocarbon fields located in provincial territory 'belong to the inalienable and imprescriptible patrimony' of the Province, and declares as a priority the promotion and development of plans to increase production, including the full development of the petrochemical industry and 'the industrialization of the resources at their place of origin' (the legal root of local-content and local value-added rules).(2) Royalty — THE KEY number: Art. 61 sets that the production concession holder shall pay monthly 'as royalty on the output of liquid hydrocarbons extracted at the wellhead, a percentage of twelve percent (12%), which the provincial Executive may reduce down to five percent (5%) considering the productivity, conditions and location of the wells'. That is: in the provincial text the 12% is not a discretionary choice of whichever decree — it is the framework law's number, and the only flexibility its wording gives the Executive is downward (to 5%). ⚠ BUT mind this, IT IS NOT AN effective ceiling today: the Ley Bases 27.742 (Art. 132) replaced Art. 59 of national law 17.319, which now sets the royalty as 'a percentage equivalent to the one determined in the award process' (and 15%+X in public bidding, Art. 47) — and the provincial CENCH decrees ground their rate on that national article, not on Art. 61 of this law. The reading 'the 12% is a legal ceiling that explains why the 18% was never instrumented' was proven false.(3) TAX stability: Art. 58 establishes that 'during the life of permits and concessions, the Province may not levy new taxes on their holders nor increase existing ones, except for a general increase of provincial taxes, or taxes collected by the national State, or those replacing the latter'. It is a fiscal-stability clause of LEGAL rank and general scope, prior and parallel to RIGI: the concession holder already has it under the framework law.(4) Fees: Art. 59 sets the annual, paid-in-advance exploration fee per km² for category II/IIa (Possible) areas across three periods ($10.56 / $21.12 / $31.60 per km²) plus extensions ($2,112/km² the first year, +50% cumulative per year); Art. 60 sets the annual production fee at $419.50/km². ⚠ These are nominal values in 2004 pesos: the law empowers the Executive to raise them 'at its sole discretion' if the relation with the other variables 'is significantly altered' — today's current amount does NOT come from this law and is not verified.(5) Settlement and anti-underreporting: Arts. 62-66 define 'computable production' and 'wellhead' (the point where the State collects the royalty without computing transport costs), require a monthly sworn statement within 30 days with the wellhead value reported IN dollars, and — key — Art. 64 provides that if there is economic linkage between concession holder and buyer, or no prices are set, or the product goes to further industrialization, the price is set 'according to the current value of the product in the domestic market': the anti-transfer-pricing lock was already in the 2004 law. Art. 66 lets the concession holder request a per-well rate reduction by proving the production is not economically exploitable, with the enforcement authority deciding 'without appeal'. Arts. 67-71 regulate collecting the royalty IN kind (the State must give 90 days' notice; it stays in place at least 6 months) — meaning the 'novelty' of collecting royalties in kind pushed by Figueroa is a power the framework law already granted. verif · Mar 10, 2004 ↗
In force
In force since its promulgation by Decree 0371/04 (March 2004), and with the original text of its Art. 61 intact: Amendments surveyed (2026-07-17) — Law 2453 was amended by ONE single law in 22 years, Law 2839 (01/11/2013), which changed its Art. 119 (definition of 'state-owned companies') as part of converting GyP into a corporation; it did NOT touch Art. 61 or the royalty regime. The official BO record states: 'Regulated: Decree 3124/04 | Amended: Law 2839 | Status: Published'. ⚠ BUT THE effective framework changed from above: the Ley Bases 27.742 (BO 7/8/2024) Replaced arts. 47, 57, 58, 58 bis and 59 of national law 17.319 — the fixed 12% ceased to exist in the national regime (the royalty becomes 'the one determined in the award process', with a 15%+X base in bidding) and fees became expressed in barrels of oil per km² adjusted by ICE Brent. The provincial CENCH decrees of 2025 ground their rate on Art. 59 of the 17.319 (national), not on Art. 61 of this law. How the two texts articulate is an open legal question this dataset does NOT resolve. verif · Mar 22, 2004 ↗
Who it affects
Every hydrocarbons operator and concession holder in Neuquén — it is the framework under which every exploration permit and every production concession is granted, including the non-conventional CENCH of Vaca Muerta (YPF, TotalEnergies, Pampa, Vista, Shell and the rest). For the investor of the main skin: here is the activity's real fiscal regime, not in the headlines — the 12% royalty people talk about is this law's number (Art. 61), and provincial tax stability (Art. 58) is a right the concession holder has by framework law, no RIGI needed. For the satellite ecosystem the effect is indirect but real through two channels: (a) Art. 1 declares as a priority 'the industrialization of the resources at their place of origin', the legal root on which the provincial local-content rules later rest; (b) Art. 66 (per-well royalty reduction for wells not economically exploitable, decided 'without appeal' by the enforcement authority) gives the province a lever of discretion over the economics of mature wells — relevant for whoever looks at workover and reverted conventional areas. prob · Mar 10, 2004 ↗
The norm
Ley provincial 2453 of Neuquén. Passed by the Honorable Provincial Legislature on Mar 10, 2004; registered under number 2453 on Mar 22, 2004; enacted by provincial Decreto 0371/04 (signed Sobisch / Silvestrini). Official text: a 28-page PDF in the provincial digest (infoleg.neuquen.gob.ar/Leyes/Ley_2453.pdf), a scan with no OCR. Relevant structure: Title I 'Disposiciones Generales' (General Provisions; Arts. 1-10: provincial ownership, enforcement authority, area categories Proven / Secondary interest / Possible / High exploratory risk); Section VI 'Tributos y Derechos' (Taxes and Fees; Arts. 58-61: tax stability, exploration fee, production fee, 12% royalty); Arts. 62-71 (computable production, wellhead, royalty affidavits, reduction for wells that are not economically producible, royalty in kind). Art. 8 preserves the mining properties granted to private parties before the law, which remain governed by their original contractual terms. verif · Mar 22, 2004 ↗
Our reading
When people argue over how much rent Neuquén takes from Vaca Muerta, the argument is almost always about decrees. But it pays to look further down: the provincial framework law of 2004 sets the royalty at 12% on liquids at the wellhead, and the only margin it gives the governor is to lower it to 5% for weak wells. That number is still intact: in 22 years the 2453 was amended only once, and for something else. Now —and this is what sorts out the noise around the '18% floor' (announced in Sep-2025, never instrumented)— that 12% is no longer a ceiling: the Ley Bases rewrote the national regime and the royalty became *whatever is determined in the award*, with a 15%+X base in public bids. That is why GyP's round can tender 13-17% without breaking anything: it is not a provincial invention, it is the national law's mechanism. And that is why the CENCH decrees instrument 12%: not because they cannot go higher, but because they are concessions already agreed, where the law orders respecting what was covenanted. For the investor there is a second piece of news, better and less told: Art. 58 forbids the Province from creating new taxes or raising existing ones for the life of the concession. That is fiscal stability by framework law, free and with no paperwork — what RIGI adds is not the concept but the federal rank, the 30 years and the arbitration. And the 'anti-transfer-pricing' celebrated as an innovation of the LNG agreement was already written in 2004: Art. 64 orders settling at current market value when there is economic linkage between seller and buyer. The province is not improvising rules: it is using them. thesis
Where it lands, province by province1
Neuquén Hydrocarbons framework law: provincial ownership of the fields, legal 12% royalty on liquids at the wellhead reducible by the Executive to 5% (original text intact: only amendment in 22 years = Law 2839, on corporate Art. 119), provincial tax stability during permits and concessions (Art. 58), per-km² fees (2004 nominal values, overtaken by the national barrel-denominated fee of the Ley Bases), settlement by monthly sworn statement at wellhead value in dollars with an economic-linkage lock (Art. 64) and the power to collect the royalty in kind (Arts. 67-71). ⚠ The 12% of Art. 61 does NOT operate as a ceiling since the Ley Bases: the national regime moved to 'the royalty determined in the award' (15%+X base in bidding). favorable thesis
The other rules on this subject28
The State reorders the trunk gas pipelines and forces firm transportation contracts to be redrawnRes. SE 66/2026 (Official Gazette, Mar 13, 2026) + Res. ENARGAS 409/2026in execution
Hydrocarbons: the prior domestic-offer step for exports is goneSE Res. 166/2026 (Official Gazette, Jul 22, 2026)in force
The Comahue returns to private hands: 4 dams awarded in concessionRes. 2124/2025, Ministry of Economy (Official Gazette Dec 30, 2025)in force
End of segmentation: energy subsidies are targeted at those who need themDecree 943/2025 (Official Gazette, Jan 2, 2026)in force
Ignacio Aredez· Chief analyst
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How to read the seals → verif primary source · prob primary source pending · unconf not sufficiently backed · estim our own calculation · thesis our reading